



welt  
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hilfe

# POLICY PAPER

## COOPERATION WITH ARMED FORCES

## Armed Forces – A Partner?

In the last few years, profound changes have occurred in the international system that have been reflected, in particular, in an increasing occurrence of military interventions. In view of these developments, non-governmental organisations providing humanitarian and development aid in the context of military intervention have to reconsider their own activities and develop a coherent approach for their work. One aspect of this approach is the issue of their relationship to armed forces.

This paper argues in favour of a profile-oriented approach: based on Welthungerhilfe's guiding principles, a code of conduct is defined which distinguishes between the possible forms of interaction between NGO and armed forces and takes into account the different contexts in which contact with armed forces is possible.

The following position can be noted: If the armed force is a party involved in conflict (national armies, non-govern-

ment armed players, UN missions according to Chapter VII Article 42, NATO, occupying power), interaction between the armed forces and NGO is limited to the sharing of work-related information, i.e. exchange about which measures are to be implemented in which regions with which staff. No other form of interaction takes place. The sharing of work-related information occurs equally with all parties involved in the conflict. This presupposes that in acute conflict situations, a political position and therefore partiality are renounced. If the armed force is not a party involved in conflict, a whole range of other forms of interaction is possible – informal communication, transfer of security-related information, use of military infrastructure. The joint implementation of projects, however, is rejected as a matter of principle.

### 1. Introduction

Whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan or Haiti, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), involved in humanitarian aid and development cooperation are working more and more frequently alongside international response forces which are involved in combat operations. Under the heading Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), these troops sometimes also take on humanitarian tasks such as building wells or schools. This blurring of boundaries between humanitarian and military activities, however, puts relief agencies at risk and turns them into a potential target of attack. In view of the fact that intervention in unstable states and NGO involvement in these states can be expected to increase in future, the following „Policy Paper“ clearly defines Welthungerhilfe's

position towards armed forces, both in terms of its own activities and those of armed forces. To this effect, the following paper provides first of all an overview of the relevant developments in international politics in the past few years and the dilemma this poses for NGOs. This is followed by an explanation of the parameters that determine Welthungerhilfe's position in terms of cooperation. These parameters include Welthungerhilfe's guiding principles, the different contexts in which contact between the armed forces and NGOs occurs, and the various ways in which interaction with the military can take place. Upon this basis, Welthungerhilfe's position towards armed forces will then be developed. The conclusion will summarize the findings of the paper and based upon this formulate appropriate political demands.

## 2. Background

The question of civil-military cooperation is particularly relevant in terms of the security of NGO staff. Based on the Red Cross' „Code of Conduct“, many organisations, including Welthungerhilfe, rely not on protective measures such as armoured vehicles or methods of deterrence such as armed escorts when carrying out their activities in the context of armed conflicts, but on acceptance of their work by the population and parties involved in conflict. The basic premise for this acceptance is adherence to the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality in war regions. This includes a clear dissociation from military units. Unlike the Red Cross, many relief agencies working in conflict regions have a mixed mandate. They deliver both humanitarian aid and carry out development measures, and they are committed to the „Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development“ (LRRD) approach. At the same time, many organisations receive a substantial share of their funding from government donors. Until the 90s, this way of working posed no major problems. In most cases, NGOs worked in contexts in which their donors were clearly not a party involved in conflict. This included civil war-torn countries such as Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nicaragua, El Salvador and many others, as well as countries involved in interstate wars, such as Eritrea/Ethiopia. Efforts generally addressed the needs of the population. The greatest possible distance was maintained to parties involved in conflict, and communication occurred only if this was necessary for the implementation of humanitarian efforts. If the international community intervened in these conflict countries, this usually occurred in the form of peace missions under the auspices of Chapter VI of the Charter, which were approved by both parties involved in conflict and whose mandate permitted use of force only for purposes of self-defence. The proximity of many NGOs to these UN missions and simultaneous involvement in humanitarian and development aid did not therefore call into question their

neutrality and impartiality or undermine their acceptance among the population and parties involved in conflict.

### Definitions

**Military actors** are the armed units of a state or alliance of states, which are deployed to defend against attack by third parties or lead an attack against third parties. Military organisations are characterised by a hierarchical structure with military authority.

**Development cooperation** is the cooperation between donor and developing countries and non-governmental organisations, the aim of which is to improve social, economic, political and ecological conditions and institutions in developing countries. Development cooperation embraces financial, technical and staff cooperation.

**Humanitarian actors** are non-commercial civil organisations, both non-governmental and national and international, which subscribe to humanitarian principles and provide humanitarian aid.

**Humanitarian aid** refers to support provided in response to a humanitarian crisis, the aim of which is to save lives and relieve suffering. It includes immediate relief and rehabilitation and, above all, helps victims cope with an immediately life-threatening situation. Humanitarian aid is provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality, i.e. irrespective of the ethnic origin, religion or nationality of the recipient, without discrimination of any kind. Priorities are set solely on the basis of requirements. Relief is not used to promote certain political or religious viewpoints; it may not be misused by a country as an instrument of foreign policy.

This situation has started to change since the 90s. At least two developments in the security architecture of the international community are responsible for this. The first development occurred on a normative level and can be summed up by the term „Responsibility to Protect“ (R2P). Under the impact of the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, it became a general conviction that states are not only responsible for protecting their own people but that they must also protect peoples whose governments are unable or unwilling to protect them themselves. According to the R2P principle, this responsibility should be understood primarily in a preventive sense, but it can also imply use of force beyond self-defence. This occurred, for example, in Somalia and Kosovo. With the R2P and the ensuing military interventions in the internal affairs of states – mandated according to Chapter VII, Article 42 of the UN Charter – the previously valid principle of sovereignty and therefore the consent of all parties involved in conflict became increasingly insignificant.

The second development occurred on an operative level and concerns the relationship between security and development. The debate about the relationship between security and development is not in itself new. Peace and stability have already been discussed as necessary conditions for development in the past. However, earlier discussions saw the relationship between the two areas as an abstract interdependency. Current debates, on the other hand, focus much more on bringing together these two areas in practice. This is reflected in the increasing integration of security policy and development cooperation within the framework of interventions and related state-building processes. The aim is to increase the efficiency of peacebuilding missions. Probably the best-known examples of this development in practice are the so-called „Provincial Reconstruction Teams“ (PRTs) and the „Civil Military Cooperation“ (CIMIC) components of NATO in Afghanistan. But

in other countries, too – in the Sudan or Democratic Republic of Congo – a growing number of potential points of contact are arising between military and civilian players.

In view of their own mandates and orientation, these developments present non-governmental organisations such as Welthungerhilfe with a serious dilemma. On the one hand, many NGOs finance their projects in a number of countries almost exclusively from funds provided by public donors (World Bank, EU, BMZ), and also work well beyond the field of humanitarian aid in development projects with a clearly political orientation, for example, as part of democracy-promoting measures. On the other hand, as a result of an increasing willingness to use force within the context of peacekeeping efforts (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq), many of the donor countries have themselves become parties involved in conflict. If NGOs want to continue to rely on the acceptance approach for their security, however, this line of action becomes extremely problematic. Unlike the past, this new situation now calls into question the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. There is an increasing risk that NGOs are identified with the donor as a party involved in conflict. This inevitably leads to a rejection by the other party/ies involved in conflict with the result that NGOs, as the weakest link in the chain, are becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack by armed players. This problem is exacerbated further by the blurring of boundaries between civil and military activities by CIMIC. Organisations like Welthungerhilfe, that are active in unstable states, have to find answers to this new situation. In the face of a radically changing environment, procedures that helped in the past are no longer effective today. The organisations' own principles have to be reviewed and implemented in a consistent and coherent approach. Part of this approach involves a revision of the position of relief agencies with regards to armed forces.

Welthungerhilfe's position towards civil-military cooperation and the relationship between armed actors and civil actors in general is based on three elements. It is based on the guiding principles of Welthungerhilfe, it is sensitive to the different roles played by armed forces in the different working

## Definitions

**Chapter VI of the UN Charter** regulates the peaceful settlement of disputes through "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."<sup>1</sup>

**Chapter VII of the UN Charter** regulates "actions in response to threats to peace or breaches of peace or acts of aggression". According to Article 41 of Chapter VII, the Security Council can decide which action to take with the exception of the use of weapons. Under Article 42, the Security Council "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations".<sup>2</sup>

**Responsibility to Protect (R2P)** is a concept developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). It specifies that states are not only responsible for protecting their own people but that they must also protect those peoples whose governments are unable or unwilling to offer them

protection themselves. The R2P was adopted by the United Nations in a report on the 2005 World Summit and affirmed in security resolution 1674.

**Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)** is a strategic concept developed by NATO, which defines the cooperation and coordination of the NATO commander and civil actors in support of a mission. Civil actors include both the local population and authorities as well as international, national and non-government organisations and agencies.<sup>3</sup>

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)** are units consisting of international, civilian and military staff. Their task is to provide security and help with the reconstruction of a country. They were deployed for the first time by the USA in Afghanistan in 2001. PRTs were subsequently set up in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the command of some PRTs has since been transferred to the states under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

**Military intervention** refers to the armed interference of one state or coalition of states in the internal affairs of another. If humanitarian causes are cited as the reason for intervention, the term „humanitarian intervention“ is frequently used. However, this term is highly contentious. In the eyes of its critics, use of force can never be humanitarian. For this reason, the term is not used in this paper.

1) <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

2) <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

3) <http://www.nato.int./ims/docu/mc411-1-e.html>

contexts in which Welthungerhilfe and armed actors operate, and it takes a differentiated view of the various forms of interaction that are possible. The following section of the paper presents the guiding principles of Welthungerhilfe's work abroad.

#### 4. Guiding principles of the work of Welthungerhilfe

Four guiding principles are fundamental to Welthungerhilfe's position regarding its relations to armed forces:

**1. Proximity to the population:** Welthungerhilfe endeavours to help people help themselves and to transfer responsibility for measures to the local people. It therefore aims to establish maximum proximity to target groups. Cooperation with village committees and self-help groups are a key element of its work. This applies, whenever possible, not only within the framework of development aid projects but also for emergency relief measures, especially during the transition to the reconstruction phase.

**2. Security through acceptance:** Determined by the principle of proximity to the people, Welthungerhilfe focuses not on protective measures (e.g. armoured vehicles) or deterrence (e.g. armed escorts) to secure peace, but on its acceptance as an organisation. It strives to gain recognition not only among the local population but also among all conflict parties equally. The security of Welthungerhilfe staff must be given top priority.

**3. Independence:** To be able to make decisions without external constraints, it is important for Welthungerhilfe to remain independent of other players. In particular, Welthungerhilfe uses this independence to be

able to act in accordance with its own principles and based upon the needs of the population.

**4. Effectiveness and efficiency of aid:** Welthungerhilfe strives to achieve maximum effectiveness and sustainability in its work. To promote harmonisation, it seeks to work with other organisations involved in humanitarian aid and development cooperation.

These four principles form the basis of Welthungerhilfe's position as regards relations with armed forces. Depending on the role armed forces play in a country, however, these principles are influenced in different ways. In the next section, a systematic distinction is made between armed forces involved in conflict and those not involved in conflict.

#### 5. Working contexts and the role of military forces

There are numerous contexts in which interaction may occur between Welthungerhilfe and armed forces. Welthungerhilfe works in many countries where war or natural disasters have caused severe damage and where armed actors are also active. Armed actors can occur in the form of UN missions, international response forces, an occupying power and in the form of national armies and non-state armed groups. Regardless of the conditions in which interaction with armed forces is considered, it is important to decide whether the party is involved in conflict or not.

**1. Party involved in conflict:** Parties involved in conflict always include those armed actors directly implicated in a conflict (national military forces and non-government armed groups). Further parties involved in conflict are external actors such as occupying forces and international response troops, irrespective of whether or not they are NATO-led, and under certain cir-

cumstances UN missions, namely when they have a mandate according to Chapter VII, Article 42, which permits use of force.

**2. Not a party involved in conflict:** Under certain circumstances, armed actors cannot be considered parties involved in conflict. One example is when armed forces are deployed in natural disasters (this does not apply in the case of „complex emergencies“, however, i.e. when conflicts coincide with natural disasters). Another example of armed actors not involved in conflict are UN missions which are mandated according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter which rule out the use of force.

The differentiation between „parties involved in conflict“ and „parties not involved in conflict“ allows a more dynamic approach towards armed actors. Depending on the different stages of a conflict, behaviour towards the same actor may be adapted. Generally speaking, whenever armed forces are involved in conflict, Welthungerhilfe distances itself far more distinctly from these forces while increasing efforts to gain the acceptance of all conflict parties for its work. To achieve this acceptance, Welthungerhilfe refrains from carrying out any measures which could be deemed partial, especially in conflicts in which the UN, NATO or other coalitions are involved as parties.<sup>4</sup>

## 6. Welthungerhilfe's position as regards interaction with military forces

Interaction with military forces can occur in different ways. A distinction can be made between at least five forms of interaction: 1. During assignments abroad, informal contact may occur with military forces, for example, during recreation – promoted in part by a common German (or western)

identity. 2. Another possible form of interaction is the sharing of work-related information with armed forces. This may concern, for example, the whereabouts and nature of measures to be carried out and the staff who are to perform the work. 3. Interaction may also take place in the form of the transfer of security-related information. This includes, for example, information about the activities of parties involved in conflict, the structures of conflict parties or their whereabouts. 4. The use of military infrastructure is a further form of interaction with armed forces. Infrastructure includes, for example, medical care in military hospitals, postal services, transportation and staff, for example, in the form of escorts. 5. The most far-reaching form of interaction with armed forces is the joint implementation of projects. This means that armed forces and NGOs work under the same project management. The following section examines Welthungerhilfe's position with regards to interaction with armed forces, when these are involved in conflict and when they are not involved in conflict. The different forms of interaction are systematically referred to the guiding principles of Welthungerhilfe. Do they call these into question, do they promote them, or do they have no effect on them?

### 6.1. Interaction with parties involved in conflict

If the armed force is a party involved in conflict, utmost caution is called for during interaction. The following positions can be noted with regard to interaction with military forces:

**1. Informal contact:** Welthungerhilfe cannot dictate how its employees behave in their leisure time. However, it strongly advises them to engage in informal contact with military personnel only if communication with all parties involved in conflict and a maximum degree of acceptance have been achieved as a result of sharing work-related information (see below). The

*4) This concerns, in particular, development aid projects with a political orientation, for example democracy-promoting projects.*

same applies to private amusements such as visits to bars and restaurants run by military forces. If the sharing of work-related information works with all parties involved in conflict, informal contacts impact neither the effectiveness of work nor the security and proximity of the population or the impartiality of Welthungerhilfe, because a high level of transparency has been achieved. Friendly contact to military forces is generally avoided.

**2. Sharing of work-related information:** Welthungerhilfe always shares work-related information with parties involved in conflict because it makes it possible to carry out the projects more efficiently and guarantees transparency. It occurs both in Germany<sup>5</sup> and in assignment countries. The effective sharing of information forms the basis of an acceptance of Welthungerhilfe among the parties involved in conflict and thereby increases the security of staff. It is important that information sharing occurs equally and uniformly with all conflict parties and that the measures that are communicated are acceptable to all parties involved in conflict. This is generally more common if they are impartial. Such work-related information sharing has no impact on Welthungerhilfe's proximity to the population or independence. Generally speaking, the more limited the work-related information sharing, the more strictly rules about other forms of interaction must be observed.

**3. Sharing of security-related information:** On principle, Welthungerhilfe passes on no security-related information to parties involved in conflict. This principle is communicated to all conflict parties. Although the

transfer of information could increase the efficiency of relief efforts, it is extremely difficult to assess the impact this information may have. By passing on information to UN missions – for example, about the activities of non-state armed groups in certain regions – military operations, for example, could be facilitated. In this way, Welthungerhilfe would clearly take sides and possibly forfeit its acceptance by at least one of the parties involved in conflict. The security of staff would be seriously undermined. Through this mechanism, the proximity to the population would subsequently also be severely impaired.

The situation in terms of the use of information from military forces or armed groups is slightly different. This is on principle possible and should be aimed at. It has no negative impact on the principles, on the contrary, it promotes security and efficiency. When work-related information sharing works, military forces should not insist that the exchange of information presupposes „give and take“ – contrary to frequent claims – because the risks and implications for work resulting from the transfer of information are extremely unevenly distributed.

**4. Use of infrastructure:** As a rule, Welthungerhilfe does not use the infrastructure of armed actors involved in conflict, even though this might increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation's work. Transportation of equipment and use of postal services are avoided. After a careful assessment of chances and risks, however, use of military infrastructure is possible in extreme emergencies. This applies in cases where the lives of staff and/or the population

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5) In Germany, communication with the CIMIC units of the Bundeswehr is explicitly sought. This enables all sides to gain an insight into each other's methods and aims, and any misunderstandings can be avoided.

are under acute risk. In such cases, field hospitals, means of transportation and, as a last resort, armed escorts may be used. Generally speaking, use of the infrastructure of a party involved in conflict has a serious impact on Welthungerhilfe's credibility in terms of its impartiality, and it therefore affects its acceptance and the security of Welthungerhilfe staff. At the same time, appearing together in public with armed actors changes proximity to the population. The long-term disadvantages must always be weighed up against the short-term advantages.

**5. Joint implementation:** Welthungerhilfe generally avoids the joint implementation of projects under a common management with armed actors. Although this could increase efficiency because optimum coordination could be achieved, it jeopardises Welthungerhilfe's independence, in particular, and undermines the proximity to the population and the security of staff. In the eyes of the population, direct cooperation with military forces would blur the boundaries between military and civil organisation. This would also increase risks for Welthungerhilfe staff.

Welthungerhilfe's position towards civil-military cooperation and the relationship between armed actors and civil actors in general is based on three elements. It is based on the guiding principles of Welthungerhilfe, it is sensitive to the different roles played by armed forces in the different working contexts in which Welthungerhilfe and armed actors operate, and it takes a differentiated view of the various forms of interaction that are possible. The following section of the paper presents the guiding principles of Welthungerhilfe's work abroad.

## Interaction with parties involved in conflict

### Welthungerhilfe in the Democratic Republic of Congo

For years, a bloody civil war has raged in the northeast part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in the two provinces of North Kivu and Orientale. The background of the civil war is the hitherto unresolved question of the nationality of the Rwandan-speaking people of the DRC, many of whom have lived in the DRC since colonial times. After the conflict spread to the neighbouring states of Rwanda and Uganda at the end of the 90s, a peace mission, the MONUC, was dispatched to the DRC on 30th November 1999 according to resolution 1279 of the UN Security Council. In 2005, the MONUC was finally given a "robust" mandate, permitting the use of force against non-state armed groups.

Welthungerhilfe carries out various projects both in North Kivu and in the province of Orientale. To be able to operate in the region, the organisation maintains contact with the various political players in the conflict region. In Bunia, the capital of the province of Orientale, Welthungerhilfe employs a former teacher who is responsible for communication with the armed non-state actors in the project regions. This minimizes the risks associated with working in the conflict region. Welthungerhilfe is also in contact with MONUC. Meetings with other NGOs and the MONUC are held at regular intervals in the office of the UN OCHA.

The aim of the meetings is to coordinate the activities of the NGOs amongst each other and with those of MONUC. Security-related information is not passed on because MONUC fears that planned attacks may be disclosed by NGOs. Welthungerhilfe in turn must fear that it will receive no more information from informants if it passes on information. Use of MONUC infrastructure does not occur. On the contrary, to distance itself from MONUC, which uses white vehicles, Welthungerhilfe has marked its vehicles – which also used to be white – with green stripes. No projects are carried out jointly.

## **6.2. Interaction with parties not involved in conflict**

If military forces are not parties involved in conflict, for example in the case of natural disasters or within the framework of UN missions according to Chapter VI, Welthungerhilfe's principles are affected less by interaction. Another code of conduct then applies:

### **1. Informal contacts:**

Welthungerhilfe staff may enter into contact with military forces since it can be assumed that, in the case of natural disasters and peacekeeping missions which do not use force, the staff enjoy a good reputation with the population and are regarded favourably by the parties involved in conflict.

### **2. Sharing of work-related information:**

Work-related information sharing always occurs. The same advantages as described under Item 6.1 arise. The rules about equality of communication and acceptance do not have to be considered to the same extent as in the case of parties involved in conflict.

### **3. Sharing of security-related information:**

If an actor is not a party involved in conflict, Welthungerhilfe might also share security-related information. On principle, the transfer of information undermines neither the security of staff, nor proximity to the population for the reasons stated under Item 1 (informal contact). An exchange of information may increase the efficiency of projects.

### **4. Use of Infrastructure:**

The military's infrastructure may be used. This should increase the efficiency of work. For the reasons stated under Item 1, no negative effects on Welthungerhilfe's impartiality, its proximity to the population or the security of staff are likely to occur. Moreover, in these cases, the military is at best only lightly armed and therefore has no or only a minor deterrent effect.

### **5. Joint implementation:**

Despite greater interaction with military forces which are not involved in conflict, the joint implementation of projects is not sought after. Although this kind of cooperation might increase the efficiency of relief efforts, such a procedure would oppose the principle of independence. In the case of natural disasters, exceptions to this rule are possible since the objectives of both players may concur under such circumstances and assignments are usually extremely brief.

In all cases of interaction with armed actors not involved in conflict, the situation has to be carefully analysed. If the actor is likely to become involved in conflict, e.g. within the framework of UN missions if the mandate changes, or if the actor cannot be clearly classified, e.g. in complex emergencies, he is treated as a conflict party as a precautionary measure.

## Interaction with parties not involved in conflict

### Example Afghanistan

On 30th May 1998, an earthquake shook northern Afghanistan. With a death toll of 4700 and over 100,000 additional casualties, the earthquake was one of the worst in the country's history. The town of Rustak, located close to the earthquake's epicentre, was virtually cut off from the outside world. To secure the lives of the people in the region, Welthungerhilfe organised aid transport from Tajikistan. Because the earthquake region could only be reached by air, all available helicopters belonging to the Russian and Tajik military were used. Nevertheless, the operation was carried out independently by Welthungerhilfe. Use of the military's infrastructure did not in this case call into question Welthungerhilfe's acceptance by the population because the military forces were not a party involved in conflict. Thanks to the Welthungerhilfe's efforts, essential items such as tents and blankets were distributed, from which thousands of earthquake victims benefited

6) Exceptions are possible under the conditions detailed in Item 6.1.1

7) Exceptions are possible under the conditions detailed in Item 6.1.4

8) The following demands are closely based on the „Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments“ developed by InterAction.

## 7. Conclusion

The defined position for interaction with military forces can be summarised in a simple table.

	Party involved in conflict	Not involved in conflict
Informal contact	No <sup>6</sup>	Yes
Work-related information	Yes	Yes
Security-related information	No	Yes
Infrastructure	No <sup>7</sup>	Yes
Implementation	No	No

Appropriate political demands in terms of the behaviour of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan can be based upon this position.<sup>8</sup>

1. From the point of view of Welthungerhilfe, military staff should be clearly distinguishable from representatives of NGOs. Military staff should wear uniforms and identify their vehicles visibly. The logos of humanitarian or development aid organisations should be affixed neither to the clothing nor the vehicles or equipment of military forces.
2. Bundeswehr staff should only enter NGO premises by prior appointment.
3. On principle, no weapons should be brought onto NGO premises.
4. As a matter of principle, the exchange of information should only take place outside military facilities.
5. NGOs pursue different goals to military forces: they should not therefore be described as partners by the military. NGOs are not implementation partners that carry out the humanitarian activities of military forces.

6. The military should abstain from humanitarian activities and concentrate on the provision of security.

Welthungerhilfe is of the conviction that maximum security for Welthungerhilfe staff and simultaneously the efficiency and effectiveness of aid can only be achieved if the above position is followed and the above demands are respected by the Bundeswehr and other armed actors.

## 8. Literature

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