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POLICY PAPER

WELTHUNGERHILFE IN FRAGILE STATES

Overview

Fragile states are the focus of governmental and non-governmental development cooperation. Welthungerhilfe also spends a large part of its financial resources on work in these countries. However, experience in the past few years has shown that beyond alleviating suffering in the short term, little substantial progress has been made to date in countries with poor governance. In most cases, attempts to promote sustainable development processes have failed because of the extremely complex challenges presented by states without functioning political institutions and with often precarious security conditions. From the point of view of Welthungerhilfe, it is therefore imperative that existing approaches and strategies are revised. Bearing in mind the specific skills and experiences that NGOs in fragile states bring with them and the risks involved in working in such environments, this Policy Paper defines a three-pronged strategy for work in fragile states. By developing local skills, promoting advocacy potentials and adopting conflict preventive methods, a comprehensive approach will be taken to improving the living conditions of the population. In the course of this approach, alternative local systems of order will be treated not as a security problem per se but as part of a solution.

Because this approach in fragile states depends on a number of preconditions and is linked to considerable challenges, key political demands must be made of state donors. This Paper therefore calls for a longer-term approach and process orientation, an adaptation of target hierarchies and success criteria, a more flexible allocation of funding and better timing for the allocation of funds.

Welthungerhilfe is active in numerous so-called fragile and failed states. In 2009, around 85 percent of Welthungerhilfe's financial resources were made available to countries with poor governance, including Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Liberia, Burundi, Haiti and Myanmar. Fragile states account for around two thirds of Welthungerhilfe's project countries.¹

In the majority of fragile states, at least part of the population does not have enough food. The proportion of people living in extreme poverty and surviving on less than a dollar a day is high and child and maternal mortality rates by far exceed those of other countries. What is particularly alarming is the fact that the situation does not seem to be improving. According to a report from the World Bank (2010), fragile states have made the least progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals and many are unlikely to achieve any of the eight goals.

Given the intensity of international commitment in fragile states, this fact is surprising. Since 11th September 2001 at the latest, fragile states have been the focus of foreign and development policy. Both European and American security strategies identify fragile states as a security threat. Within the context of the European Consensus on Development, the EU committed itself to addressing the issue of state weakness by promoting governance reforms, the aim being to reduce the "causes of state fragility and poor governance" and strengthen "capacities for non-violent social change". This objective was also incorporated in the Paris Declaration, which according to its motto "Stay engaged but differently" focuses, above all, on "strengthening

fragile states".

What are the causes of the lack of progress despite this high level of commitment and what lessons can be learned from the work that has been carried out in fragile states so far? The lack of development progress in fragile states is attributable not only to the economic and financial crisis. The last few years have highlighted the huge challenges related to developing government structures by external forces. Attempts by the international community to develop government capacities and tackle development deficits with the help of so-called "integrated approaches", i.e. in close cooperation of foreign, security and development policy, have produced only modest results.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also face considerable challenges in fragile states that have not been satisfactorily resolved yet. This is true, in particular, with regard to the sustainability of measures. Because of year-long wars and conflicts, fragile states often have virtually no civil structures. Social partners in the form of local NGOs are either non-existent or lack the necessary know-how to carry out complex projects. Transferring responsibility for projects to the local population is therefore often problematic. To ensure that projects are sufficiently established within society, innovative ideas and new approaches have to be developed.

The aim of this paper is to define Welthungerhilfe's position with regard to its work in fragile and failed states. Firstly, a critical look will be taken at the term "fragile states". Based upon the examples of the German government and the EU, two cases of governmental development cooperation will be examined and their most important approaches highlighted. The paper will then focus on the possible role of NGOs in fragile states. What advantages and disadvantages

¹ The basis of this calculation are the countries in the bottom two fifths of the "Index of State Weakness in the Developing World" by the Brookings Institution (see appendix).

tages, what risks are there for NGOs? Building on this, Welthungerhilfe's position will then be determined and political demands formulated.

2. What are fragile states?

Definitions for the term "weak state" or "fragile state" are almost as numerous as the countries to which they refer. The commonly accepted interpretation measures the fragility of a country on the basis of the different core functions of statehood in developed societies. From this perspective, it can generally be said that in fragile states the government has lost control of parts of its territory and is no longer in a position to fulfil the most fundamental functions for its citizens.

The majority of studies base their analyses on three² or four³ different criteria of statehood:⁴

Security: One key task of the state is to guarantee the security of its citizens both internally and externally. This requires a governmental administration that controls resources and maintains its monopoly on the legitimate use of force with the help of a state army and police force.

Welfare: This function focuses on public services and transfer payments as well as mechanisms for the redistribution of economic resources. These are usually financed through taxes, customs duties and other levies, and embrace the political fields of social affairs, employment, economics, education, health and environment.

Constitutional legality: This function focuses on protecting citizens through laws against arbitrary acts. A central element of constitutional legality is the division of powers, i.e. the clear division of legislative, judicative and executive powers.

Promoting economic development: The state promotes an environment that is conducive to economic growth.

In principle, the sustainable consolidation of statehood in the meaning of many studies can only be expected if all functions are developed. If a state is unable to deliver any of the core functions, one also speaks of "failed states".

Because of its reference to developing countries and its transparent use of data, this paper is based on the definition of the "Index of State Weakness" by the Brookings Institution. According to this index, fragile states are "countries lacking the capacity and/or will to foster an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; to establish and maintain legitimate, transparent, and accountable politi-

cal institutions; to secure their populations from violent conflict and to control their territory; and to meet the basic human needs of their population". (Rice/Stewart 2008).⁵

3. Criticism of the definition of fragile states

The definition of statehood according to the said functions has been the subject of fundamental criticism. It is contended, for example, that the term is too broad and embraces a whole series of very different starting situations. In practice, the question therefore arises as to what analytical value the definition actually has. Depending on how many and which of the state functions are not fulfilled, initial situations, it is argued, vary significantly and these require very different courses of action in development cooperation. This is particularly true of states that cannot guarantee the security of their citizens and where violent conflicts occur.

The political scientist Joachim Betz (2004) also notes that state functions were not performed more effectively in the past than they are today. On the contrary, the number of civil wars has decreased significantly since 1995.⁶ The "primary focus on the alleged defects of states in the non-OECD world," says Betz "could become a huge obstacle to actually understanding how societies function and how their systems of rule are reproduced."

Moreover, Betz states that "acquired, supposedly necessary state functions based upon the observation of western systems (...) are not necessarily needed for social pacification". In fact, "the alleged combination of internal peace, market orientation, democratisation, constitutional legality and social balance (...) are by no means unambiguous and universally valid".

Criticism of a "securitization of development cooperation" also builds on this and similar arguments. According to this argumentation, the definition of fragile states paves the way to subordinating development goals to security interests. The elimination of poverty is thereby classified as a contribution towards the fight against terrorism. Although the link between poverty and conflict susceptibility has been proven (World Bank 2003), Peter Waldmann (2003), for example, argues that it is dangerously simplistic to link poverty and poor governance to terrorism and war. The expectation that development cooperation could deprive terrorism of its very

⁵ A list of countries which are weak or failed states according to this definition is attached.

⁶ According to information from the Working Group on Causes of War, the highest number of wars since 1945 was recorded in 1992 at 55. This number dropped by more than half by 2009, when only 26 wars were recorded. If armed conflicts are included, the result is not quite so clear. Added together, their number (recorded for the first time in 1993) dropped from 63 to 34.

² Cf. e.g. Schneckener 2004, Klemp/Poeschke 2005, Betz 2007.

³ Rice/Stewart 2008, Fund for Peace 2009.

⁴ Another dimension, "Democracy", is sometimes included in the analysis (Zürn/Leibfried 2005).

foundation is untenable and overlooks important steps in analysing phenomena of violence. Moreover, according to Guenter Maihold, linking development policy with security policy involves the risk of development policy "inflating its own claims of competence". Development cooperation cannot be the solution to all security problems (Maihold 2005).

In practice, the close association of development and militarily dominated security policy has caused considerable problems for development policy actors. In the opinion of many NGOs, in particular the blurring of boundaries between civil and military actors involved in civil-military cooperation, such as the cooperation that has been practiced for some years now as part of the so-called "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" in Afghanistan, exposes development workers to risks. The principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality that are central for the implementation of humanitarian aid are being increasingly undermined. Civil society in conflict countries, in particular, is suffering as a result.

This criticism makes it essential that non-governmental organisations active in fragile states take a stance. The central role assigned to NGOs by state donors in connection with fragile states further underlines the necessity of defining their position.

4. Government approaches to work in fragile states

Work in and with fragile states has become a central element of development and foreign policy in many countries. The following section provides a short overview of the examples of Germany and the European Union.

Both the German government and the European Union have developed a policy framework for development cooperation in fragile states which attaches greater importance to such states than has previously been the case. According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ 2007), the reason for this stronger focus on fragile states is a process of recognition: After the end of the Cold War, national development cooperation initially concentrated on countries with stable government structures. Countries with poor governance were neglected or pressurized by means of sanctions. According to the BMZ, however, this approach rarely produced solutions and was only useful in exceptional cases. Moreover, experience clearly showed that the cost of implementing measures to prevent the complete collapse of statehood and outbreak of civil war are far lower than the costs incurred after the failure of a state. The "European consensus on development policy" also identifies insecurity and violent conflict as the biggest obstacle to the realisation of the

Millennium Development Goals to eliminate poverty (EKEP 2007: 7).

With bilateral or multilateral development cooperation reaching its limits in many poor governance countries, many donors believe that NGOs will play a key role in fragile states. They are also able to work in countries in which there are no state counterparts.

Within the framework of its work in fragile states, the BMZ (2007) distinguishes between different situations that require different action strategies. The most important criterion determining the nature of the German government's engagement in fragile states is the *development orientation* of the respective state. The BMZ ascribes a particularly important role to NGOs when governance is non-development-oriented.

Development-oriented governance: If governments signal their will to implement reforms and a willingness to engage in dialogue, all instruments of development cooperation may be used. With the help of bilateral and multilateral instruments, the government's reform agenda should be reinforced; with the help of NGOs these reforms should be established in society.

Less development-oriented governance: When governance shows little progress, the BMZ considers bilateral and multilateral cooperation to be possible only to a very limited degree. When measures are implemented, the stabilisation of existing power structures must be avoided and the principles of human rights observed. One of the main tasks of the NGOs is to support civil society, helping change societies "from within".

Non-development-oriented governance: In this case, from the point of view of the BMZ, "the implementation of projects outside state structures is usually unavoidable". The population has to be reached via NGOs or church relief organisations. The aim of efforts is to ensure that basic needs are satisfied, i.e. food supplies are secured and minimal social and infrastructural provisions are guaranteed.

The EU also ascribes a key role to civil society in fragile states. According to the European Commission, work in fragile states should be open to a wide range of actors, such as UN agencies, the Red Cross and local players. Parliaments, decentralised authorities and civil society have considerable potential to bring about change. (European Commission 2007:7).

5. NGOs in fragile states: Advantages and challenges

The special role assigned to NGOs by governments is based on a number of comparative advantages which NGOs have in fragile states. NGOs can respond with specific skills and ex-

periences, freedoms and contacts, sometimes making a contribution in areas in which state development cooperation has no impact.

- Because of their political independence, NGOs are not bound by (foreign) political targets; they can also work in countries in which the state no longer or only partially exists.
- Their plausibility and ability to provide more flexible, basic services and counselling enable NGOs to communicate with different sides in conflict regions.
- Thanks to often long-term contacts and the trust gained during their project work, NGOs have better access to marginalised groups, including in areas not accessible to state actors.
- Because the state frequently appears in fragile states as a perpetrator of violence, NGOs are often a valued contact partner for the civil population.
- NGOs can protect against human rights violations and the suppression of marginalised groups.
- Because of their proximity to the population, NGOs are better at mobilising self-help capacities, an ability that is particularly important in fragile states.
- NGOs can attract attention and support, for example in the political arena.

Because of these advantages, the distribution of responsibilities announced by governments also makes sense from the point of view of NGOs. However, when defining their own position, NGOs must also be aware of the risks and chal-

Example: Haiti

Since the earthquake on 12th January 2010, Haiti has faced an enormous challenge. The country not only has to reconstruct its destroyed infrastructure, more importantly it has to establish a stable state. The earthquake caused a disaster of such catastrophic proportions because it hit a country whose government was incapable of action even before the quake. In Haiti, efforts must now be introduced simultaneously on various levels. The country needs a comprehensive and integrated concept to make a new start. It has to succeed in strengthening both state structures and the personal responsibility of the Haitian people. Given its state weakness and the low level of civilian organisation in the country, this is no easy task. When long-term plans are drawn up, the experiences gained from various state-building processes and relief efforts after the tsunami in south-east Asia in 2004 should be drawn upon. Apart from improving the coordination of relief efforts and involving the local population and local structures more actively, this includes developing quality standards for reconstruction that also take into account disaster-prevention measures.

lenges they themselves face when working in fragile states.

- Generally speaking, it is usually difficult to plan work reliably in such countries. Particularly in crises situations, timeframes are often extremely short. What is most important for the population – and especially internally displaced persons living in refugee camps – is ensuring their immediate survival. The focus is on the present moment. Long-term investments appear inappropriate in the face of arbitrary government, uncertain prospects for the future and the possibility of (new) violent clashes occurring at any time. This makes it much more difficult to plan projects on a long-term basis. However, precisely this combination of fulfilling immediate needs with long-term perspectives is what is so necessary in fragile states.
- There is often a high level of *mistrust* in fragile states. As Brinkerhoff (2007) proved, mistrust is more pronounced in such states and the tolerance level lower than in other countries. This is true, in particular, when society is strongly fragmented as a result of deteriorating living conditions and conflicts. As a consequence of this, trust in the benevolence of cooperation efforts and the willingness to work with other social groups are disturbed. This presents a challenge, particularly to cooperation with partner organisations because civil society organisations may only represent individual social groups. Cooperations can therefore contribute towards heightening social tension.
- Another major challenge for NGOs is the *security situation* in fragile states. If the state has no or only a limited monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, it cannot guarantee the security of its citizens. This situation is also a potential threat for NGOs. Both political conflicts and economically motivated crime can threaten the lives and physical integrity of NGO staff. Security risks include abduction and robbery as well as targeted attack and the risk of being caught up in acts of war by third parties. In some countries, including Somalia, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the security risk is now so high that many NGOs are no longer able to continue their work there. Many share the view that the security risk increases within the context of military intervention because of the unclear division of civil and military duties and goals. The "security by acceptance" approach, hitherto pursued by most NGOs, no longer appears to be effective, especially in these contexts. However, it is highly questionable as to whether the observed shift to

protective mechanisms will produce the desired results.

- *Operative costs* are also usually higher in fragile states, not least of all because of the tense security situation. Security management is not only time-consuming, the necessary security equipment is also very costly. The high operative costs are also attributable to poorly developed infrastructure, which has to be replaced at great expense, particularly in the fields of communication and transport. The costs of staff, rent and other necessary infrastructure are also often higher in weak states.
- The problematic security situation also gives rise to significant *business risks*. The risk that projects fail is significantly higher in fragile states than in stable states. In some cases, projects cannot be supervised so intensively because of the security situation. This is true particularly of so-called "remote-controlled" projects. Here, projects are supervised primarily from abroad with only very few project visits taking place. This involves a significantly higher risk of corruption. Because of the lack of capacities provided by local staff, the effectiveness and efficiency of projects decline significantly.

6. Prerequisites for work in fragile states

Because of the different risks and challenges and particularly because of the security risks that exist, certain preconditions have to be guaranteed for work in fragile states to be carried out. In the OECD Development Assistance Committee, the discussion about fragile states has led to the development of the "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations". Although these principles apply to the state level, they also offer NGOs important guidelines, but these have to be adapted to the specific situation of non-government actors. One of the key criteria that determines whether or not work can be carried out in a fragile state is the *acceptance* of work by the local population. Welthungerhilfe tries to gain the acceptance not only of the local population but also of all parties involved in potential conflicts. The acceptance approach simultaneously represents the organisation's most important security concept. The success of this strategy depends, among other things, on the following conditions:

1. **Well-founded background knowledge:** One of the most important conditions that has to be fulfilled for work in fragile states to be secure and sustainable is an in-depth knowledge of the work context. This includes a sound analysis of the interests of all actors and stakeholders. Particularly when social conflicts are at stake, accurate analyses have to be prepared on the history

and causes, developments, actors, the military and political zones of influence of the conflicting parties, regional influences and existing risks.

2. **Training:** The demands made on project staff working in fragile states are extremely complex. It is therefore essential that Welthungerhilfe staff on assignments in such countries are very well trained, especially in the fields of conflict-sensitive action, and have many years' experience in development cooperation and/or humanitarian aid.
3. **Proximity to the population:** Close cooperation with and proximity to the population is not only a central working principle of Welthungerhilfe, it is also fundamental for the security of staff in violent conflicts. If it is possible to gain the trust and recognition of local staff, partners and target groups, risks can be minimised, for example, by warning against imminent unrest, passing on critical information about the security situation, influencing the conflicting parties in favour of Welthungerhilfe and granting rights to hospitality and protection agreements. This form of security management can also be referred to as a "community-based security approach".
4. **Networking:** To guarantee the security of Welthungerhilfe staff in fragile states and to increase the efficiency of their work, contact to and coordination with other NGOs and donor organisations is crucial. According to the acceptance approach, it is absolutely essential, especially in conflict situations, that contact is maintained to all parties involved in the conflict (especially those that are critical of the work of Welthungerhilfe and its partners) and that an agreement exists on the protection and safety of staff. It is important that communication is carried out justly and in a balanced way with all conflict parties and that the measures to be agreed upon are acceptable for all. This is generally more the case when measures are impartial.
5. **Differentiation:** For the purposes of security, it is vital that Welthungerhilfe staff are clearly distinguishable from military staff. One of the preconditions of Welthungerhilfe's work in fragile states is therefore a clear division of civil and military activities that is also outwardly visible (uniforms, logos, etc.). Particularly within the context of the so-called integrated missions (UN) or the comprehensive approach (NATO), which advocate linking development and security measures, a clear distinction is not always made. The blurring of civil and military duties, however, means a greater risk for relief organisations. It is then virtually impossible

to deliver relief efforts that are perceived by the population and conflicting parties as impartial and geared solely towards the needs of the people.

Apart from gaining the acceptance of the population, developing functioning protective mechanisms is also a basic requirement for work in fragile states. This includes establishing a swift and operative information system, drawing up security plans and guidelines and installing appropriate security precautions in buildings and vehicles.

These prerequisites also indicate the limitations of work in fragile states. Because of the central principle of security through acceptance, Welthungerhilfe's engagement is called into question as soon as it becomes impossible to establish contact with conflicting parties and reach agreements with conflicting parties about staff security and safety. Welthungerhilfe's work in fragile states is also questioned if the costs of security exceed the benefits of the project.

7. Promoting partner structures to achieve sustainable development in fragile states

In addition to the conditions that have to be present for Welthungerhilfe to work in fragile and failed states, Welthungerhilfe also pursues an active strategy in these countries. The central goal and focus of Welthungerhilfe's work is the elimination of the causes of hunger. To achieve this goal, the organisation promotes the self-help capacities of societies. This goal thus also applies to fragile states. But here, too, enormous challenges have to be overcome. How can sustainability be achieved in extremely volatile situations? How can long-term measures be implemented when violence and corruption necessitate an immediate response? There is no simple answer to these questions. In many fragile states, the efforts of most relief organisations therefore concentrate on emergency response projects and more short-term measures. The combination of emergency aid and sustainable development cooperation promoted by the "Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development" (LRRD) concept occurs only very inadequately. All too often, it brings with it a certain dynamics that creates dependencies and reinforces exist-

ing structures rather than breaking the poverty cycle. Welthungerhilfe believes that the key to solving this problem lies in promoting self-help capacities (1), supporting advocacy potentials (2) and preventing violence (3). In general, it assumes that close cooperation with other NGOs and development organisations in the meaning of the Paris Declaration is both necessary and desirable.

By focusing clearly on development goals and with the central role it assigns to local structures, Welthungerhilfe also responds to the above mentioned criticisms of the actual concept of fragile states. The strategy presented here aims to understand alternative local systems of order not as a security problem per se but to consider them and include them as part of the solution.

1. Promotion of local self-help capacities

Every relief activity – even in extreme emergency situations – has to be evaluated in terms of how local labour can be involved from the very beginning as "local owners". Within the context of fragile states, however, this strategy is extremely complex. Many fragile states do not have the same civil institutions as established states with a functioning democratic structure. Local NGOs only rarely satisfy standards in terms of the qualifications and transparency necessary for the implementation of complex projects. Which partners can be cooperated with under these conditions? Key tasks in this connection include identifying relevant actors (Which local NGOs are available? Which traditional local structures could be used for a cooperation – religious authorities, village chiefs, etc.? Which local staff could potentially be appointed to set up their own NGOs? What status do the selected partner organisations have in the social network? Which forces will be strengthened/weakened by the selection?) and preparing a "capacity development" strategy which is appropriate for local conditions. Finally, concepts also have to be developed to facilitate the transfer of measures to partner organisations. When implementing these concepts in fragile states, Welthungerhilfe can draw on its experience with partners in consolidated states such as India, Nicaragua or Peru.

Example: Afghanistan

One of the biggest challenges of the international engagement in Afghanistan is to strengthen the Afghan people's own responsibility. In the last few years, we have already seen how difficult this task is. Afghanistan is a tribal society where loyalty weighs far more heavily than bureaucratic rules and laws. Widespread corruption, nepotism and a civil society that is barely existent by western standards present the international community and NGOs active in Afghanistan with apparently insurmountable problems. Potential partners do not always correspond to western notions. But despite all the difficulties, there are ways to help that take into account the general cultural conditions present in Afghanistan. Alongside Afghan NGOs, which have continued to establish themselves in the past few years, projects can also be carried out in cooperation with local rulers, mullahs and district councils. One of the most difficult tasks here is to identify suitable actors. At the same time, it is important, in accordance with the "do no harm" approach, that development cooperation does not intensify existing conflicts or further strengthen opponents, but instead offers cooperative conflict solution mechanisms. One positive attempt in this context is the "National Solidarity Programme" (NSP) in which village communities identify development projects that they themselves consider most important and which they carry out with professional support. Within the framework of the programme, cooperation efforts with local partner organisations are constantly improved on site and adapted to local conditions through regular multi- and bilateral meetings. With the help of NSP coordination units, the provincial level is integrated into the national development process.

2. Supporting the advocacy work of partners

Many fragile states are unable (or no longer able) to provide the population with basic services in the fields of healthcare and education. Furthermore, in many crises situations, food supplies and access to clean drinking water cannot be guaranteed. Given these conditions, political work in such countries appears to be subordinate. Many NGOs reduce their work to basic public services, infrastructure projects and the distribution of relief goods within the framework of humanitarian aid. A World Bank study in Guinea-Bissau (World Bank 2005) confirmed that this procedure also corresponds to the expectations of the population. Asked about their main needs, the interviewees referred to various sectors including education, healthcare and road construction.

Work in fragile states, however, has shown that in terms of sustainability, it is short-sighted to concentrate solely on these areas. The inadequate provision of basic public services is closely linked to poor governance, lack of tax revenues and a high level of corruption. The "International NGO

Research and Training Centre" (INTRAC) believes that one of the biggest challenges faced by NGOs in fragile states is raising an awareness of the link between poor governance and the lack of basic public services for the population. To an increasing extent, a mixed approach geared towards good governance and the provision of basic services for citizens is therefore being pursued (INTRAC 2009). Bigger NGOs, such as Welthungerhilfe, can make a vital contribution in this respect thanks to its own experience, and support local civil society organisations with their advocacy work vis-à-vis governments.

But advocacy work in fragile states also faces serious problems. One of the basic prerequisites for its success is the existence of state structures, responsibilities and contact partners. This

Example: The Right to Food

Everyone has a right to food. This was unanimously agreed by heads of state at the World Food Summit in Rome in 1996. To promote the realisation of the right to food, voluntary guidelines were drawn up in November 2004 based on a participative and consultative process to support the step-by-step enforcement of the right to adequate food to achieve national food security, and unanimously accepted by 187 states in the FAO Council.

Welthungerhilfe was actively involved in preparing the voluntary guidelines together with FIAN, and it developed a strategy to help its partners and target groups in the countries of the south – including fragile states such as Colombia and Uganda – enforce these guidelines. This resulted in a cooperation project in 2006 between FIAN and Welthungerhilfe aimed at implementing the voluntary guidelines and promoting lobby work for the human right to food in developing countries. The first stage involved helping civil groups and organisations in partner countries correctly assess the role the state plays in realising the right to food on the basis of the guidelines. In the second step, organisations were helped to exert political pressure on governments. Partner organisations focused on such political subjects as legal frameworks, democracy, good governance, human rights and constitutional legality.

is not necessarily the case in fragile states. Lobbyists then have to decide which target groups to address. Especially in fragile states, it may therefore also be appropriate to direct political work at the powerful non-governmental actors. Identifying relevant actors, however, requires an exceptionally good knowledge of the local population.

Another major obstacle to advocacy work in fragile states is the government's attitude towards civil political activities. Generally speaking, advocacy work is far less welcome than sector-specific work in many states. This is true especially of authoritarian regimes, which see criticism and demands for greater transparency

and accountability as a threat to their own positions of power.

3. Prevention of violence rather than damage limitation

In many fragile states, different social groups compete for power and economic resources. As long as these conflicts are non-violent, they may well have a positive effect on the development of a country. However, if they become violent, the consequences for social development can be devastating, with famine, poor healthcare and little education the inevitable results. In terms of eliminating hunger on a sustainable basis, preventing violence is therefore a key part of Welthungerhilfe's work. According to Matthies (2000: 31f.), the prevention of violence is not about preventing conflicts generally, but about preventing the violent manifestation of conflicts. Prevention also aims not only to thwart direct, physical or personal violence in conflicts, but also to promote the peaceful transformation of "structural violence", in other words to help transform violent relationships to promote peace.

Welthungerhilfe plays both an active and a passive part in preventing violence (cf. DED 2002). On the one hand, Welthungerhilfe endeavours not to trigger any conflicts or intensify existing conflicts according to the "do no harm" concept (Anderson 1996). It is aware that whatever the intervention – whether it is transferring resources or symbolic capital – it has an impact on the development of the conflict in conflict contexts, and it proceeds with this in mind.

On the other hand, Welthungerhilfe is also involved in actively promoting peace. It uses familiar instruments of civil crisis prevention and conflict management. Among other things, it supports peace alliances and non-violent initiatives by networking institutions, groups and individuals who campaign for a non-violent solution to conflicts. It is active in media and PR work to publicise these initiatives and it promotes confidence-building by helping to improve conditions for dialogue processes between conflicting parties. When carrying out these activities, it strives to cooperate actively with the organisations of the Civil Peace Service (Ziviler Friedensdienst).

8. Prospects

Work in fragile states has been a focus of development cooperation in Germany and many other countries for several years. Welthungerhilfe also concentrates on fragile states in its work. About three quarters of Welthungerhilfe project countries are fragile states. Work in such countries however represents a very special challenge. In the present paper, a strategy has been developed on the basis of lessons learned from the LRRD approach and practical experience gained in many project countries, the aim of which is to

support sustainable development in fragile states. Particular emphasis has been placed on the importance of work with local partners. By developing local skills and promoting concepts of advocacy, Welthungerhilfe aims to improve the living conditions of the population in a comprehensive way. This might also mean having to distance ourselves from well-trodden paths in development cooperation and developing new methods of cooperation with local partners on the basis of local expertise.

Because this approach in fragile states is linked to many preconditions and faces considerable difficulties, key political demands follow from this. To enable NGOs to promote sustainable development by strengthening and using local capacities in fragile states, the goal of developing local capacities must be reflected more strongly in politics and in the tenders of international donors.

- The development policy pursued in fragile states is currently conceptualised from a "northern perspective". The "**south perspective**" is only inadequately considered, and the potential of existing local resources and power structures is not included on an appropriate scale in support programmes.
- In spite of the understandable desire to achieve results fast, the **long-term perspective and process orientation** as a basis of state commitment should not be neglected. A "quick impact" strategy and flagship projects, such as those that are frequently pursued, are inappropriate in fragile states. To promote the responsibility of local staff and to identify and establish suitable partners, NGOs need longer timeframes and greater flexibility in their project work in fragile states. Donor countries have to consider this fact in their aid policy, and NGOs must guarantee appropriate timeframes for the implementation of projects. The prevailing practice of funding short-term projects in fragile states should be revised in favour of longer-term missions. Alternatively, framework agreements could be made to combine several projects and guarantee greater planning reliability.
- It is also necessary to **adapt target hierarchies and success criteria**. Contrary to the donor's own rhetoric, funds are sometimes still spent on quantifiable results rather than on "soft skills" that are less readily measurable. Evaluations of projects also usually focus on quantifiable results. Particularly in terms of cooperation with local partner organisations, NGOs may have to make concessions when it comes to immediately measurable project results. This is because many partner organisations do not (yet) have the same standards as international NGOs. However undesirable these dis-

advantages may initially seem, in the long term it will not be the flagship projects that will be decisive for the success of work in fragile states but the extent to which the population supports and actively contributes towards the reconstruction process.

- Furthermore, the **timing for the allocation of funds** has to correspond more effectively to the needs in fragile states. Currently, project funding often arrives **too late**, notably when a state is already fragile; often it does not arrive until society is deeply fragmented and social conflicts have arisen. In terms of civil crisis prevention, appropriate funding should be made available at a much earlier stage. To be able to detect conflicts and deteriorating conditions in fragile states early on, appropriate monitoring mechanisms have to be developed. A similar argument applies to the immediate post-crisis period. After the acute emergency has been overcome, donors often reduce funds too quickly and too radically. Up until this point, however, no self-supporting development can have occurred. To avoid a relapse in the crisis, the same commitment is needed as in the emergency situation. Donors have to consider this fact in their planning.
- Because of the high security risks to which NGOs are exposed in fragile states, donors must consider the **costs of security management** when allocating funding. In high-risk countries, security costs can account for up to 40 percent of the project budget. They include the costs of immediate protective measures – for example radio and telephone equipment, generators, security guards and security training – as well as the costs of carrying out a fundamental context analysis and liaising with the most important social groups. According to the "do no harm" principle, more resources have to be invested in an assessment of the political, cultural and social-economic context.
- Finally, donors have to take seriously NGOs demands for the **clear division of civil and military efforts**. In recent years, individual states and the international community have in some cases intervened militarily in fragile or failed states. In the course of these missions, development cooperation became more and more part of a comprehensive concept, the primary aim of which was to combat insurgencies (key words: integrated mission and networked security). However, in this approach, civil aid is at risk of being dominated by military considerations. It is not the task of development cooperation to "win the hearts and minds" of the population for the Bundeswehr and to protect camps on the basis of its work but to tackle hunger and poverty in the countries where it

is needed most. Non-governmental development cooperation should not be allowed to become the extended arm of the Bundeswehr.

Terms and definitions

Capacity Development refers to the development and promotion of individual, organisational and social skills and capacities for defining and achieving development goals. In the past few years, the term "capacity development" has repeatedly replaced the term "capacity building". "Capacity building" was criticized for not considering existing local capacities.

Local Ownership refers to the relationship of local actors to measures of humanitarian aid and development cooperation. In particular, it refers to the influence they exert on the planning of measures and the responsibility they have for their implementation and success.

LRRD stands for "Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development" and refers to a concept that aims at efficiently linking emergency aid, rehabilitation and development cooperation. The LRRD approach works on the assumption that the three sectors of support are not a chronological succession of phases (continuum) but that in practice they coexist (contiguum). Among the criteria which projects have to fulfil according to the LRRD approach are the participation of target groups in the planning of projects, the promotion of self-help skills, preferential cooperation with local partner organisations and avoidance of isolated individual measures.

Advocacy aims to give a voice to under-represented social groups and exert an influence on public policy. Advocacy can be carried out by individuals or groups and embraces numerous activities, including media campaigns, public speeches and the publication of research and survey results. A special form of advocacy work is lobbying which involves making direct contact with legislative bodies to influence political issues and legislative processes.

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9. Appendix

INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD							
(Bottom Two Quintiles Only)							
The 141 weakest states and their index basket scores are presented below. A basket score of 0.00 represents the worst score in the 141-country sample, a score of 10.00 signifies the best.			Color Coding Key Color coding and quintiles are based on full sample of 141 countries			BOTTOM QUINTILE	
						2 ND QUINTILE	
						3 RD QUINTILE	
						4 TH QUINTILE	
						TOP QUINTILE	
Rank	Country	Overall Score	Economic	Political	Security	Social Welfare	GNI Per Capita
1	Somalia	0.52	0.00	0.00	1.37	0.70	226
2	Afghanistan	1.65	4.51	2.08	0.00	0.00	271
3	Congo, Dem. Rep.	1.67	4.06	1.80	0.28	0.52	130
4	Iraq	3.11	2.87	1.67	1.63	6.27	1134
5	Burundi	3.21	5.01	3.46	2.95	1.43	100
6	Sudan	3.29	5.05	2.06	1.46	4.59	810
7	Central African Rep.	3.33	4.11	2.90	5.06	1.25	360
8	Zimbabwe	3.44	1.56	1.56	6.81	3.84	350
9	Liberia	3.64	3.39	3.91	6.01	1.25	140
10	Cote D'Ivoire	3.66	5.23	2.12	3.71	3.56	870
11	Angola	3.72	5.42	2.67	5.32	1.45	1980
12	Haiti	3.76	3.90	2.62	5.21	3.31	480
13	Sierra Leone	3.77	5.04	3.87	5.43	0.76	240
14	Eritrea	3.84	3.09	2.78	7.01	2.48	200
15	North Korea	3.87	0.52	0.95	7.28	6.73	n/a
16	Chad	3.90	5.80	2.42	6.18	1.21	480
17	Burma	4.16	4.72	0.89	3.96	7.07	n/a
18	Guinea-Bissau	4.16	5.22	3.83	5.96	1.69	190
19	Ethiopia	4.46	6.14	4.03	5.91	1.75	180
20	Congo, Rep.	4.56	5.08	2.77	6.45	3.95	1100
21	Niger	4.60	5.45	4.69	7.33	0.94	260
22	Nepal	4.61	5.17	3.84	2.94	6.50	290
23	Guinea	4.67	5.00	2.64	7.43	3.61	410
24	Rwanda	4.68	5.33	4.26	6.62	2.51	250
25	Equatorial Guinea	4.77	7.51	1.73	7.95	1.91	8250
26	Togo	4.80	4.78	2.68	7.38	4.38	350
27	Uganda	4.86	5.78	4.55	4.89	4.23	300
28	Nigeria	4.88	5.39	3.51	5.37	5.24	640
29	Cameroon	5.12	5.78	3.09	7.54	4.07	1080
30	Yemen	5.18	5.80	3.64	6.43	4.85	760
31	Comoros	5.20	4.24	4.20	8.18	4.20	660
32	Zambia	5.23	5.08	4.59	8.15	3.11	630
33	Pakistan	5.23	6.58	3.52	4.69	6.13	770
34	Cambodia	5.27	6.33	3.00	7.18	4.57	480
35	Turkmenistan	5.27	5.05	1.40	7.88	6.75	1700
36	Uzbekistan	5.30	5.20	1.78	6.66	7.54	610
37	Mauritania	5.30	6.23	4.34	6.38	4.24	740
38	Djibouti	5.31	5.05	3.69	8.21	4.29	1060
39	Mozambique	5.32	5.60	5.33	8.35	1.98	340
40	Papua New Guinea	5.32	5.13	4.62	7.45	4.08	770
41	Swaziland	5.33	5.57	3.65	8.28	3.80	2430
42	Tajikistan	5.35	6.18	3.03	6.39	5.82	390
43	East Timor	5.51	3.93	4.41	7.74	5.98	840
44	Burkina Faso	5.51	6.30	4.87	8.30	2.59	460
45	Laos	5.53	5.88	2.56	7.98	5.71	500
46	Malawi	5.60	5.68	4.83	8.11	3.77	170
47	Colombia	5.63	5.84	5.79	1.78	9.11	2740
48	Bangladesh	5.64	6.08	3.97	6.55	5.98	480
49	Madagascar	5.65	5.24	5.95	7.65	3.76	280
50	Kenya	5.65	5.77	4.72	6.95	5.15	580
51	Gambia	5.79	5.26	4.54	8.29	5.06	310
52	Mali	5.85	6.33	6.16	8.49	2.43	440
53	Lesotho	5.88	4.59	6.40	8.35	4.18	1030
54	Solomon Islands	5.92	4.59	5.05	7.66	6.39	680
55	Tanzania	5.94	6.38	5.41	8.08	3.89	350
56	Sri Lanka	5.94	6.32	5.47	3.38	8.59	1300

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